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RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: 
THE WINDING PATH TOWARD ACCOMMODATION 
MARTHA McCARTHY* 
Since the mid-twentieth century, some of the most significant church/state 
controversies have focused on religious influences in public schools or 
government aid to religious schools.  Indeed, during the past several decades 
the Supreme Court has had at least one Establishment Clause case on its docket 
each term, and schools have provided the context for the most widely watched 
decisions.  This article focuses on the evolving law pertaining to public school 
controversies, with particular emphasis on developments since 2000.  Attention 
will be given to public school access for community and student religious 
meetings, student-initiated devotionals in public school events, and other 
selected religious influences in public schools (reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance and distributing and posting religious materials).  The last section 
will briefly address potential conflicts between judicial rulings and the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in 
Public Elementary and Secondary Schools issued in February 2003.1 
I.  LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Interpretations of the First Amendment’s religion clauses have evoked 
volatile debate and generated extensive legal commentary, but in the final 
analysis, these provisions simply mean what a majority of the Supreme Court 
justices conclude they mean.  After all, it was “emphatically” established two 
centuries ago that the judiciary has the authority and duty “to say what the law 
is.”2  Not only are the various tests used to evaluate claims under the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses judicially created, but the meanings 
attached to these tests have changed over time depending on the composition 
of the Supreme Court. 
 
* Martha McCarthy, Ph.D., is a Chancellor’s Professor at Indiana University and specializes in 
educational law and policy.  Recent coauthored books include Public School Law: Teachers’ and 
Students’ Rights and THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF TEACHERS AND STUDENTS, both published by Allyn 
& Bacon in 2004. 
 1. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 68 Fed. Reg. 9645 (Feb. 28, 2003).  See infra note 201. 
 2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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The Supreme Court in the early 1960s relied on the Establishment Clause 
to bar daily prayer and Bible reading under the auspices of the public school,3 
but there have been numerous subsequent attempts to infuse religion into the 
public school program.  Constitutional amendments to this effect have even 
been proposed on a regular basis.4 
This article argues that Thomas Jefferson’s “wall of separation” between 
church and state, which guided church/state litigation from the mid-twentieth 
century into the 1980s, no longer characterizes Establishment Clause doctrine.5  
The “wall” metaphor has been replaced by the concepts of equal treatment and 
equal access for religious and secular groups and expression.  The wall has 
been referred to as a “blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier” that can only be 
“dimly perceived,” 6 and even this indistinct barrier seems to be tumbling 
down.  Since the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court has moved away from 
interpreting religious neutrality as requiring church/state separation and has 
embraced instead the notion that neutrality “affirmatively mandates 
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility 
toward any.”7 
Illustrative of the judicial shift in interpreting the Establishment Clause are 
changes in the tests that courts use to assess claims under this provision.  The 
three-part Lemon test8 was used consistently in Establishment Clause cases 
involving education issues from 1971 through the 1980s to invalidate a number 
of government practices that were found to advance religion or create 
 
 3. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962). 
 4. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 7, 108th Cong., 149 CONG. REC. H60 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2003); 
H.R.J. Res. 12, 107th Cong., 147 CONG. REC. H223 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2001) (proposing 
constitutional amendments to authorize voluntary school prayer). 
 5. Chief Justice Rehnquist has been one of the central critics of this metaphor.  In 1985, he 
declared that the wall “is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless 
as a guide to judging.  It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.”  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  The origin of this metaphor was a letter written 
by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 in which he refused a Baptist association’s request for a day to be 
established for fasting and prayer in thanksgiving for the nation’s welfare.  See ROBERT HEALEY, 
JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 130-32 (1962). 
 6. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 
U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). 
 7. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 8. To withstand scrutiny under the traditional Lemon test, government action must: (1) have 
a secular purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor impedes religion, and (3) 
avoid excessive government entanglement with religion.  Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
612-13 (1971).  See also Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970) (adding the 
entanglement prong in rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the tax exempt status of 
church property). 
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excessive government entanglement with religion.9  This stringent test has 
been replaced by a judicial approach that employs an endorsement standard,10 
a coercion test,11 a modified Lemon analysis,12 or perhaps all three, depending 
on the situation.  These multiple tests provide justices with more flexibility in 
deciding whether religious accommodations are warranted under specific 
circumstances.  Given the evolving interpretations of the various tests, the 
justices’ disposition seems more important in determining a case’s outcome 
than is the choice of a particular judicially-created standard.  Some courts have 
appeared to fold the endorsement standard into the coercion test or have 
otherwise combined elements from different standards in evaluating the 
constitutionality of specific claims.13 
Church/state controversies that involve competing claims under the 
Establishment Clause, on one hand, and the Free Exercise and Free Speech 
Clauses, on the other, have been prevalent in recent public school cases.14  
These cases are troublesome because accommodations to free exercise and free 
speech rights can be seen as advancing religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause, but efforts to guard against state sponsorship of religion 
can threaten protections under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses.  
This interplay and tension among First Amendment guarantees have 
 
 9. In a case outside the school domain, the Court relied on “tradition” instead of Lemon in 
upholding the practice of hiring a member of the clergy to open legislative sessions with a prayer.  
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983).  For a discussion of the education cases 
applying Lemon, see NELDA CAMBRON-MCCABE, MARTHA MCCARTHY, & STEPHEN THOMAS, 
PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’ RIGHTS 25-65 (2004) (the historical 
discussion of cases in this manuscript builds in part on this chapter). 
 10. Under the endorsement standard, government action will be invalidated if an objective 
observer would view the actions as endorsing or disapproving religion.  See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 
687-88 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 11. This standard requires direct or indirect government coercion on individuals to adopt a 
religious belief.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
 12. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807-08 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
232-34 (1997) (making it explicit that consideration of excessive entanglement is simply part of 
the policy’s primary effect, thus modifying the Lemon test).  This modified test is more like the 
Establishment Clause standard used prior to 1971.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. 
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). 
 13. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-12 (2000); Newdow v. U.S. 
Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 486-87 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted in part sub nom., Elk Grove Unified 
Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 384 (2003). 
 14. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 104 (2001); Santa Fe, 
530 U.S. at 301-02.  In a higher education case, the Supreme Court recently noted the “play in the 
joints” between the two religion clauses in rejecting a challenge to a state’s prohibition on the use 
of scholarship funds for a student to prepare for the ministry.  Davey v. Locke, No. 02-1315, 129 
S. Ct. 1307 (Feb. 25, 2004).  The Court found no violation of free exercise rights in restricting the 
scholarship to secular degrees, even though use of the scholarship for pastoral studies would not 
abridge the Establishment Clause.  Id. 
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complicated the judiciary’s assessment of the appropriate role of religion in 
public schools. 
II.  EQUAL SCHOOL ACCESS FOR RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND GROUPS 
In the 1960s and 1970s, it was often assumed that the Establishment 
Clause demanded differential treatment of religious expression, resulting in the 
exclusion of proselytizing speech from government forums.15  More recently, 
however, the Supreme Court has concluded that the differential treatment of 
religious perspectives compared with other private expression constitutes 
viewpoint discrimination in violation of the Free Speech Clause.16  Ira Lupu 
has observed that “even the standard-bearers of the separationist tradition have 
been prepared to cede territory in the name of competing rights . . . .  These 
include the rights to be free of official discrimination with respect to religious 
exercise, freedom of speech, and freedom of association.”17 
Legal recognition of equal access for religious expression and groups in 
educational settings often is traced to the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision, 
Widmar v. Vincent, in which the Court held that the Establishment Clause does 
not demand exclusion of student religious groups from a forum created for 
student expression on state-supported college campuses.18  The Court 
concluded that the provision of campus access to a range of student groups has 
a secular purpose and does not advance religion or excessively entangle the 
state with religion.19  Moreover, the Court held that if the university barred 
student religious meetings, such action would abridge students’ free speech 
rights.20  Although the Court in Widmar directly addressed the public forum 
parameters in public universities, it did not resolve questions pertaining to 
more impressionable, younger students.21 
 
 15. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1402 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 550 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other 
grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 
F.2d 1038, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1982); Brandon v. Bd. of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-79 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
 16. For some elaboration on this concept, see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 
819, 890-99 (Souter, J., dissenting); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 
F.2d 381, 386 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 17. Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 249 
(1994). 
 18. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981). 
 19. Id. at 274-75. 
 20. Id. at 269. 
 21. See id. at 271-72 (noting the differences between college and secondary students). 
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A. Free Speech Protection of Religious Meetings in Public Schools 
Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the First 
Amendment’s protection against viewpoint discrimination in connection with 
community religious groups holding meetings in public schools during non-
instructional time.  In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District, the Court held that if secular community groups are allowed to use the 
public school after school hours to discuss topics such as family life and child 
rearing, a sectarian group desiring to show a film series addressing these topics 
from religious perspectives cannot be denied similar access.22  In short, 
policies governing facility use during nonschool time that discriminate against 
a religious group’s message abridge the Free Speech Clause.23 
In 2001, the Supreme Court delivered an important decision, Good News 
Club v. Milford Central School, allowing a private Christian organization to 
hold its meetings in a New York public school immediately after classes 
ended.24  The Milford School District had denied the Good News Club’s 
request to hold afternoon meetings at the school by invoking its community-
use policy that allowed various civic and recreational groups to use the school, 
but not for religious purposes.25  The club’s meetings admittedly were religious 
in nature and designed to teach Christian values to children ages six to 
twelve.26  Because the club was engaging in religious worship and instruction, 
the school district argued that the meetings right after school would appear to 
bear the school’s imprimatur in violation of the Establishment Clause.27 
The lower courts agreed with the school district, but the Supreme Court 
reversed the Second Circuit’s decision.28  The Court majority in Milford held 
that the school district’s policy discriminated against religious viewpoints and 
 
 22. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-97. 
 23. See also Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 845-46 (invalidating a state-supported university’s 
policies that singled out student religious groups in denying them student activity funds to use in 
distributing religious materials); see infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 24. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  See also Culbertson v. 
Oakridge Sch. Dist. No. 76, 258 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding the Good News 
Club’s right to meet in the public school after school hours but prohibiting teachers from 
distributing permission slips for the meetings because such action would unconstitutionally 
promote the club). 
 25. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13. 
 26. Mark Walsh, Religious Club Seeks ‘Good News’ From Court, EDUC. WK., February 21, 
2001, at  20.  The club is affiliated with a national organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship, 
which has more than 4,500 clubs nationwide.  Id.  According to the Good News Club literature, 
its purpose is to “evangelize boys and girls with the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ and establish 
them in the Word of God and in the local church for Christian living.”  Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. 
Dist. 49-5, 274 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1087 (D.S.D. 2003). 
 27. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13. 
 28. Id. at 112-14. 
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thus abridged the Free Speech Clause.29  The majority relied heavily on its 
reasoning in Lamb’s Chapel,30 even though Milford school authorities 
attempted to distinguish the showing of films primarily to adults from meetings 
of the Good News Club that target young children and involve religious 
instruction and prayer.31  Finding this distinction without merit, the Supreme 
Court noted that it is constitutionally irrelevant whether moral lessons are 
taught through films or live storytelling and prayers.32  Like the religious group 
in Lamb’s Chapel, the majority reasoned that the Good News Club could not 
be denied school access based on the religious content of its meetings.33  The 
majority declared that the Court had never barred private religious conduct 
during nonschool hours simply because elementary school children might be 
present.34  While not refuting Justice Souter’s contention in his dissenting 
opinion that the clergy-led meetings were “evangelical” worship services,35 the 
majority instead focused on Free Speech Clause protection of the religious 
viewpoints expressed during the club’s devotional meetings.36  Under the 
Milford ruling, if a public school creates a limited forum for community 
meetings during nonschool hours, it cannot deny access to religious groups, 
even though students attending the school are the central participants in the 
groups’ devotional activities.37  In Milford, free speech rights clearly prevailed 
over Establishment Clause restrictions. 
The Supreme Court in Milford seemed to eliminate the distinction between 
religious viewpoints and religious worship.  Prior to Milford, some lower 
courts had condoned the use of public school facilities for community groups 
to discuss topics from sectarian perspectives but had not allowed public 
schools to be used for religious worship.38  Yet, in post-Milford decisions, 
courts have held that religious groups must be allowed to hold devotional 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 107-14. 
 31. Id. at 108. 
 32. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108-110.  See also Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. 
Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1503 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 33. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 115. 
 34. Id.  But see Wigg, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1108 (upholding the school district’s denial of a 
teacher’s request to participate in Good News Club meetings immediately after school at the 
school where she taught given Establishment Clause concerns, but recognizing that she could 
attend such meetings held at other schools). 
 35. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 36. Id. at 109-10. 
 37. Id. at 113. 
 38. See Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 482, 487 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding the school district’s policy excluding religious services from the limited forum created 
for community use); Full Gospel Tabernacle v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 27, 164 F.3d 829 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(upholding the denial of a religious group’s use of school facilities because the district had not 
created a forum for religious worship); see infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
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services in public schools, if other community groups are granted school 
access.39  For example, an evangelical church in New York City had been 
denied public school access to hold Sunday worship services based on the 
school district’s standard operating procedures that allowed school premises to 
be used for a variety of community activities excluding religious services or 
instruction.40  The Second Circuit approved the school district’s action in 
1997,41 but in light of the Milford ruling, the church again applied for use of 
school space.42  This time, the Second Circuit held that because the Supreme 
Court in Milford had overruled its earlier holding, the school district’s policy 
distinguishing worship from the discussion of religious viewpoints violated the 
religious group’s free speech rights.43  The appeals court quoted the Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Milford that “quintessentially religious activities could 
be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character development 
from a particular viewpoint,” which triggers Free Speech Clause protection.44 
Some student religious clubs have also relied in part on the First 
Amendment to challenge their discriminatory treatment in public schools.  The 
Ninth Circuit found a school district had committed viewpoint discrimination 
against a student religious club with respect to access to school supplies, audio-
visual equipment, and school vehicles.45  Moreover, the court held that even 
though the student/staff period was considered instructional time, the religious 
group should be treated like secular student groups in being allowed to meet 
during this period.46  The court declared that such equal access is required by 
the Free Speech Clause and does not violate the Establishment Clause.47  The 
Third Circuit similarly ruled that a school’s denial of a student bible club’s 
request to meet during the student activity period, when secular student clubs 
were allowed to meet, constituted viewpoint discrimination in violation of the 
Free Speech Clause.48  Declining to decide whether viewpoint discrimination 
could be justified by a state’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause 
infraction, the court noted that it did not have to confront “this thorny issue” 
because the Establishment Clause was not implicated by the club’s request.49  
 
 39. See, e.g., Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 300 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2002), on 
remand, No. 98-2605 Sect. C(1), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13559, *19 (E. D. La. July 29, 2003). 
 40. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 331 F.3d 342, 345 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 43. Id. at 354. 
 44. Id. at 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111). 
 45. Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 1091. 
 47. Id. at 1091-92.  See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 48. Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 49. Id. at 226. 
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These cases also involved claims under the Equal Access Act that are 
addressed below.50 
B. Equal Access Act and Student Devotional Meetings 
Given that into the 1980s high school students were having little success in 
securing First Amendment protection of their religious meetings during non-
instructional time,51 Congress enacted the Equal Access Act (EAA) in 1984.52  
Under this law, federally assisted secondary schools that have established a 
limited forum for student groups to meet during non-instructional time cannot 
deny school access to noncurriculum student groups based on the religious, 
philosophical, or political content of their meetings.53  Although championed 
by the religious right, the EAA’s protection of student expression extends far 
beyond religious speech. 
In 1990, the Supreme Court in Board of Education of Westside Community 
Schools v. Mergens rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the EAA, 
recognizing the law’s secular purpose of preventing discrimination against 
religious and other types of private student expression.54  The Court 
emphasized that while government speech promoting religion is prohibited by 
the Establishment Clause, private religious expression is protected by the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.55  Federal appellate courts in subsequent 
cases have ruled that state laws requiring greater separation of church and state 
than demanded by the Establishment Clause must yield to federal rights 
guaranteed by the EAA56 and that the EAA allows a student religious group to 
ensure the spiritual content of its meetings by requiring certain officers to be 
Christians.57 
 
 50. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1078-83; Donovan, 336 F.3d at 219-25.  It had generally been 
assumed that the EAA extended protection of student expression in public schools beyond 
constitutional guarantees, but in both of these cases, the religious clubs realized greater relief 
under the First Amendment than the EAA. 
 51. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Indep. Sch. Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1396 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 541 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 52. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2002). 
 53. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2002).  School staff can be present at religious meetings only 
in a “nonparticipatory capacity” to maintain order.  Id. at § 4071(c)(3). 
 54. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990). 
 55. Id. at 250. 
 56. See Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trs., 66 F.3d 1535, 1540 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting the EAA 
as allowing student religious groups to meet during the lunch period since it was non-instructional 
time and other student groups were allowed to meet); Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 
F.2d 641, 646 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the EAA prevailed over state law requiring greater 
separation of church and state than demanded by the Establishment Clause; thus, a student 
religious group was entitled to meet during the public school’s limited forum for student 
meetings). 
 57. See Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist., 85 F.3d 839, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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The Third Circuit continued this expansive interpretation of the EAA’s 
protection of student religious expression in 2003.  The appellate court held 
that a school’s student activity period was non-instructional time, even though 
students were required to be in a club meeting, study hall, library, tutoring 
session, or similar activities during the period.58  Ruling that the school had 
created a limited open forum in the activity period for noncurriculum student 
groups to meet, the court declared that “to conclude that mandatory attendance 
means that any school period is actual classroom instruction is to undercut both 
the specific language and the statutory purpose of the EAA.”59  Thus, student 
religious groups were allowed to meet during the activity period.60 
However, the Ninth Circuit reached an opposite conclusion regarding what 
constitutes non-instructional time, reasoning that a student/staff period, when 
student clubs were allowed to meet, was instructional time because students 
were expected to be present and attendance was taken.61  Despite this finding, 
the Ninth Circuit broadly interpreted EAA rights as entitling the student 
religious club to be featured in the school yearbook free of charge and to use 
the public address system and bulletin boards, like secular groups, as part of 
school access for their meetings.62  And, as noted previously, the club also was 
able to use the First Amendment to secure access to the student/staff period as 
well as other school resources available to secular clubs, even though these 
entitlements were not covered by the EAA.63 
School districts can comply with the EAA by restricting school access to 
student clubs that are curriculum related (i.e., declining to create a limited 
forum for student expression).  Thus, some controversies have focused on what 
constitutes curriculum-related clubs, and most of these cases have not dealt 
with religious groups.64  Courts generally have reasoned that to be considered 
curriculum related, the club must relate to content that has actually been taught 
in courses.65  In a case involving the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, a 
California appeals court held that the noncurriculum club itself would not have 
 
 58. See Donovan v. Punxsutawney Area Sch. Bd., 336 F.3d 211, 221-22 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 59. Id. at 223. 
 60. Id. at 214. 
 61. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1088. 
 62. Id. at 1074. 
 63. Id. at 1089-90.  See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 64. Many of these cases have dealt with the Gay/Straight Alliance.  See, e.g., Boyd County 
High Sch. Gay/Straight Alliance v. Bd. of Educ., 258 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2003); Colin v. 
Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (C.D. Cal. 2000); E. High Gay/Straight Alliance 
v. Bd. of Educ., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (D. Utah 1999). 
 65. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-46 (1990); 
Pope v. E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 12 F.3d 1244, 1251-54 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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to be student-initiated to be protected under the EAA — only its on-campus 
meetings would need to be initiated by students.66 
Since the 1980s, the EAA has provided substantial protection to student 
religious meetings in secondary schools during non-instructional time, and 
initially this law appeared to provide more protection than available under the 
First Amendment.67  In fact, dissatisfaction with the constitutional protection 
of student religious expression in public schools provided the impetus for 
enactment of the EAA.68  Recently however, the Supreme Court has broadly 
interpreted the First Amendment’s prohibition against viewpoint 
discrimination as giving considerable protection to private speech, including 
religious expression, in public schools.69  Because First Amendment 
protections are not confined to federally funded schools or to the secondary 
level, this may portend fewer EAA suits and more First Amendment claims 
involving student devotional meetings in public schools.  A key consideration 
in the constitutional cases is how broadly courts will interpret the category of 
protected private expression, which is addressed in the next section. 
III.  STUDENT-INITIATED DEVOTIONALS: PRIVATE ACTORS? 
Among the most controversial current church/state issues is whether the 
Establishment Clause is implicated when students initiate and lead devotionals 
in certain situations in public schools.  In short, what constitutes private 
religious expression in the public school context that is protected by the Free 
Speech Clause and does not abridge the Establishment Clause? 
A. The Aftermath of Weisman 
Part of the motivation for the recent wave of legislative activity pertaining 
to student-initiated religious activities in public schools was the negative 
reactions to the 1992 decision, Lee v. Weisman, in which the Supreme Court 
 
 66. Schoick v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562, 568 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001) (finding triable issues regarding whether the school had established a limited forum 
for noncurriculum student groups to meet). 
 67. Compare Mergens, 496 U.S. at 244-247 (holding that if a federally assisted secondary 
school allows one noncurriculum group to meet it is subject to the EAA and must not 
discriminate against student expression based on its content) with Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 
U.S. 260, 267-73 (1988) (interpreting the First Amendment as giving broad authority to school 
personnel to censor student expression in school publications and school-related activities unless 
the school had explicitly created a forum for student expression); see supra note 54 and 
accompanying text. 
 68. See S. REP. NO. 98-357 at 3-4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2348, 2349-50 
(describing the history of the legislation, including the arguments of the religious leaders and 
other representatives of religious organizations who spoke in support of the EAA). 
 69. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 820; Lamb’s 
Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391. 
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struck down a Rhode Island school district’s policy that permitted principals to 
invite clergy members to deliver invocations and benedictions at middle and 
high school graduation ceremonies.70  In Weisman, the majority reasoned that 
the policy had a coercive effect; students should not have to make a choice 
between attending their graduation ceremony and respecting their religious 
convictions. 71  Although Weisman was a separationist decision, the Court=s 
ruling did not reduce graduation devotionals as intended.72  In fact, it had quite 
the opposite effect, as negative reactions to this ruling resulted in school 
authorities and students finding creative strategies to include prayers in 
graduation ceremonies.73  In some districts, baccalaureate services, which had 
not been held for many years, were reinstated with the districts renting space to 
churches or other groups to conduct the religious services for their graduates.74 
Many post-Weisman controversies have involved student-led devotionals 
that allegedly do not abridge the Establishment Clause because they are 
protected by the Free Speech Clause and do not represent the public school.  
Some school districts have designated the graduation ceremony a forum for 
student expression.  As a result, school personnel do not review students’ 
messages, and thus religious comments are not considered school sponsored.  
The Ninth Circuit upheld an Idaho school district’s policy that barred school 
authorities from censoring students’ graduation speeches presented in a forum 
created for student speakers to select “an address, poem, reading, song, musical 
presentation, prayer, or any other pronouncement of their choosing.”75  The 
 
 70. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 577. 
 71. Id. at 597-599.  The Court’s majority reasoned that the policy had a coercive effect 
because students felt peer pressure to participate in the devotionals that were conducted at the 
school-sponsored graduation ceremony.  However, four of the justices who joined the majority 
also signed concurring opinions in which they asserted that coercion would be sufficient to 
abridge the Establishment Clause, although it is not a necessary prerequisite. Id. at 599 
(Blackmun, J., joined by Stevens and O’Connor, J. J., concurring); id. at 609 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens and O’Connor, J. J., concurring). 
 72. Martha McCarthy, Free Speech Versus Anti-Establishment: Is There a Hierarchy of 
First Amendment Rights?, 108 EDUC. L. J. 475, 481 (1996). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist., 826 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (D. Wyo. 
1993) (holding that students could rent the high school gym for a baccalaureate program because 
the event was not school sponsored, even though the school band performed and the district’s 
graduation announcements mentioned the baccalaureate program); Verbena United Methodist 
Church v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 704, 715 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding that a 
school board must take all reasonable measures necessary to remove itself from a baccalaureate 
service sponsored by religious organizations and held in space rented from the school district). 
 75. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded 
en banc, 177 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1999).  See also Goluba v. Sch. Dist. of Ripon, 45 F.3d 
1035, 1036 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that student-initiated recitation of the Lord’s Prayer 
immediately before the high school graduation ceremony did not represent the school and thus 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
576 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:565 
court reasoned that the policy was permissible because student speakers were 
selected based on secular criteria (academic standing) and not encouraged by 
school personnel to include devotionals in their remarks.76  Upon rehearing the 
case, the full appellate court vacated the panel decision because the plaintiff 
had graduated, but the contested policy was not invalidated.77 
In two other Ninth Circuit cases, however, the appeals court allowed 
school districts to prevent students from delivering proselytizing graduation 
speeches that had been submitted to the school principals for review pursuant 
to school policies.78  In one of these cases, which the Supreme Court declined 
to review, the school district had informed the student that proselytizing parts 
of his graduation speech would have to be removed to respect the 
Establishment Clause, but the student could retain references to his own 
beliefs.79  The student then suggested that a notation be included in the 
graduation program, disclaiming school sponsorship of his speech, which he 
argued would eliminate the school’s Establishment Clause vulnerability for the 
proselytizing message.  The school declined to do this but allowed the student 
to announce that his speech had been involuntarily altered and that those 
interested could get a copy of the full text following the ceremony.  The court 
found that requiring the speech to be altered instead of issuing a disclaimer did 
not violate the student’s First Amendment rights.80  School authorities in this 
district had clearly maintained control of the graduation ceremony, and the 
court found censorship of proposed religious speeches appropriate to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation.81  The central consideration in these cases 
appears to be whether the school has explicitly established a forum for student 
expression in the graduation ceremony; if not, school personnel can review 
students’ graduation speeches, and they may have a duty to censor 
proselytizing speeches. 
B. Authorizing Devotionals Through Student Elections 
Some school districts responded to Weisman by allowing students to 
decide through voting whether to include student-led devotionals in graduation 
ceremonies and other school activities; this practice has been extremely 
 
did not violate an injunction prohibiting school personnel from authorizing, conducting, 
sponsoring, or intentionally permitting prayers during the graduation ceremony). 
 76. Doe, 147 F.3d at 835. 
 77. Doe, 177 F.3d at 799. 
 78. Lassonde v. Pleasanton Unified Sch. Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 124 S. Ct. 78 (2003); Cole v. Oroville Union High Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2000). 
 79. Lassonde, 320 F.3d at 981-82 (all facts in this section are taken from pages 981-82 of the 
court’s opinion). 
 80. Id. at 984. 
 81. Id. 
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controversial.  The Fifth Circuit upheld the practice of allowing students to 
decide by election whether to have nonsectarian graduation prayers selected 
and delivered by students, concluding that the student election breaks the link 
to school sponsorship.82  The court further reasoned that the school district’s 
resolution authorizing seniors to choose students to deliver the invocations had 
the purpose and primary effect of solemnizing graduation ceremonies and not 
advancing religion.83  However, the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
rendered opposite opinions, ruling that school authorities could not delegate to 
students decisions that the Establishment Clause forbids school districts from 
making. 84  Such elections would impermissibly allow the majority of students 
to impose their religious preferences on all students holding minority beliefs. 
In a significant decision in 2000, Santa Fe Independent School District v. 
Doe, the Supreme Court found that a Texas school district’s policy authorizing 
student-led devotionals before school football games violated the 
Establishment Clause.85  Prior to 1995, the student council had a designated 
chaplain, who delivered a prayer at all home varsity football games.  After this 
practice and other initiatives returning devotionals to the schools were 
challenged, the district adopted a policy governing prayer at football games 
and a similar graduation prayer policy that authorized an election to determine 
whether to have invocations with a second election to select the student to 
deliver them.  Both policies subsequently removed the “nonsectarian, 
nonproselytizing” restriction on the prayers86 but specified that if judicially 
enjoined, the earlier policies with this restriction would be in effect.87 
 
 82. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), vacated and 
remanded, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992), on remand, 977 F.2d 963, 969 (5th Cir. 1992).  See also 
Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a challenge to a state-supported 
university’s use of invocations and benedictions in commencement ceremonies; finding no 
coercion on adult students who have the maturity to choose among competing beliefs). 
 83. Jones, 977 F.2d at 986. 
 84. ACLU of N.J. v. Blackhorse Pike Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1477 (3d Cir. 1996); 
Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 455 (9th Cir.1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1154 
(1995).  See also Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (invalidating 
a Mississippi law that allowed student-initiated prayers in all school assemblies, sporting events, 
commencement ceremonies, and other school-related events as violating the Establishment 
Clause by permitting student-led prayers at virtually all school activities); Comm. for Voluntary 
Prayer v. Wimberley, 704 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1997) (striking down a voter initiative to authorize 
student-initiated voluntary prayer in most school-related activities as clearly intended to 
encourage prayer). 
 85. Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809-14 (5th Cir. 1999), aff’d, 530 U.S. 
290 (2000) (all facts in this section are taken from pages 809-14 of the court’s opinion). 
 86. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1782 (1993) defines “prayer” as 
“a solemn and humble approach to Divinity in word or thought.”  WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1538 (1993) defines the term “nonsectarian” as “not being an 
adherent of a particular religious sect or reflecting narrow attachment to a sect or denomination.”  
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The Fifth Circuit reiterated its position that an election can be used to 
authorize student-initiated graduation prayers, even though it rejected the 
assertion that such devotionals could be considered private speech or that the 
graduation ceremony is a limited public forum.88  However, the court held that 
the football game policy abridged the Establishment Clause, even with the 
stipulation that the prayers had to be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing.89  The 
court distinguished student-led graduation prayers from devotionals at athletic 
events that occur more often, involve a greater student age range, and cannot 
be justified as necessary to make sporting events more solemn.90 
The Supreme Court addressed only the policy authorizing student-led 
prayers before football games and struck it down as representing school-
sponsored devotionals.91  The Court found both perceived and actual 
endorsement of religion and was not convinced that the student elections 
eliminated the Establishment Clause infraction.92  The majority held that 
student-led devotionals at a school event, on school property, and representing 
the student body under the supervision of school personnel, could not be 
considered private speech.93  In holding that the use of student elections simply 
ensures that minority views would never be aired, the Court recognized that the 
purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain topics from being subjected to 
majority rule.94  The Court emphasized that even though the choice of speakers 
and content was made by the students, the school organized the student 
election.95  Although the Court did not rule that delegating decisions to 
students removed Establishment Clause concerns, it stressed that there must be 
evidence of government sponsorship of devotionals to abridge the First 
Amendment.96 
 
Because prayer by its nature depicts a particular faith (those believing in prayer and God), 
“nonsectarian prayer” appears to be an oxymoron. 
 87. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 812-13. 
 88. Id. at 820. 
 89. Id. at 816-18.  See also Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 406-407 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (describing a high school graduation as a “once in a lifetime event” contrasted with 
athletic events that are held in settings far less solemn and extraordinary). 
 90. Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 822-23. 
 91. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302-03 (2000). 
 92. Id. at 308. 
 93. Id. at 310. 
 94. Id. at 316-17 (citing Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 236 (2000) (upholding 
a university’s mandatory student activity fees, but ruling that student elections to determine what 
speech is subsidized by the university abridge the Free Speech Clause by disenfranchising those 
who hold minority views)). 
 95. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317. 
 96. Id. at 313.  In his strident dissent in Santa Fe, Chief Justice Rehnquist faulted the 
majority for its holding and for its tone, which he claimed “bristles with hostility to all things 
religious in public life.”  Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 579 
Santa Fe, like Weisman, is considered a separationist decision,97 but it did 
not resolve what distinguishes protected private religious expression from 
unconstitutional school-sponsored devotionals.  Santa Fe involved a blatant 
effort to impose prayer and was preceded by a series of school district 
initiatives designed to promote Christian doctrine at school events.98  Thus, 
even an accommodationist-leaning court could not condone the challenged 
practice in Santa Fe without totally abandoning the Establishment Clause. 
In several pre- and post-Santa Fe rulings, some of which the Supreme 
Court has declined to review, federal appellate courts have expansively 
interpreted the reach of the Free Speech Clause in protecting students’ private 
religious expression in public schools.99  For example, in Adler v. Duval 
County School Board in 2000, the full Eleventh Circuit reversed the appellate 
panel’s decision that had invalidated a challenged school district policy.100  
The appellate court en banc upheld the policy authorizing seniors to identify 
classmates to give graduation messages that the speakers select.101  Even 
though the school district’s memo outlining the policy was entitled 
“Graduation Prayer,” the court declared that the student elections were not to 
identify classmates to deliver devotionals because the content of the graduation 
messages was determined by the students.102 
A second Eleventh Circuit ruling, Chandler v. James, lifted part of an 
injunction that had prohibited students from publicly expressing religious 
views in most public school activities in Dekalb County, Alabama.103  At issue 
was a 1993 Alabama law, enacted in response to the Weisman decision, which 
 
 97. Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. 
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 808 (2001). 
 98. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307-09.  The Court carefully reviewed the school district’s history 
of Christian observances in its schools.  The initial suit in 1995 complained of numerous 
proselytizing activities (i.e., teachers promoting Christian revival meetings and chastising 
children of minority faiths) in addition to the school district’s practice of allowing students to 
read overtly Christian prayers at graduation ceremonies and home football games.  Id. at 308.  
There also have been post-Santa Fe controversies in the school district.  In 2002, allegations of 
indifference by school personnel to religious harassment of a Jewish student by classmates were 
settled out of court for an undisclosed damages award.  Erica Goldman, Santa Fe School District 
Closes Second Case Involving Religion, 17 TEX. LAW., March 4, 2002, at 5. 
 99. See Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded (for 
reconsideration in light of Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe), 530 U.S. 1256 (2000), reinstated on 
remand sub nom. Chandler v. Siegelman, 230 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 
916 (2001); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated and 
remanded (for reconsideration in light of Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe), 531 U.S. 801 (2000), 
reinstated on remand, 250 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1065 (2001). 
 100. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 174 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 1999), vacated and different 
results on rehearing en banc, 206 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 1077. 
 102. Id. at 1074. 
 103. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1254. 
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had permitted nonsectarian, non-proselytizing, student-initiated, voluntary 
prayers, invocations, and benedictions during school-related events and 
extracurricular activities.104  The district court upheld graduation prayers but 
ruled that the remainder of the law failed the Lemon endorsement and coercion 
standards by sweeping too broadly.105  The court also enjoined school officials 
in DeKalb County from assisting students in religious activities.106  On appeal, 
the Eleventh Circuit lifted the part of the injunction that had prohibited all 
student religious expression during school, declaring that the Establishment 
Clause does not require, and the Free Speech Clause does not permit, 
suppression of student-initiated religious expression in public schools or 
relegating it to whispers.107  The appeals court emphasized that a school policy 
tolerating religion does not unconstitutionally endorse it.108  The court further 
declared: 
Permitting students to speak religiously signifies neither state approval nor 
disapproval of that speech.  The speech is not the state’s — either by 
attribution or by adoption. The permission signifies no more than that the state 
acknowledges its constitutional duty to tolerate religious expression.  Only in 
this way is true neutrality achieved.109 
The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decisions in both Chandler and 
Adler and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of Santa Fe, 
and the Eleventh Circuit subsequently reaffirmed both rulings.110  The court 
recognized that school-sponsored student prayer, condemned in Santa Fe, as 
well as school censorship of private student religious expression, struck down 
in Chandler, are unconstitutional.111  The appellate court reiterated that the 
district court’s injunction was overly broad because it equated all student 
religious speech in a public context at school with expression sponsored by the 
public school.112  Thus, despite Weisman and Santa Fe, the federal judiciary 
continues to extend protection of student religious expression in public 
schools, as long as the expression is not clearly sponsored by the school. 
In one of the most expansive recent interpretations of what constitutes 
private in contrast to school-sponsored religious expression, the Eighth Circuit 
did not find an Establishment Clause violation in a board member’s 
 
 104. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.3 (2003). 
 105. Chandler v. James, 958 F. Supp. 1550, 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1997). 
 106. Id. at 1568. 
 107. Chandler, 180 F.3d at 1261. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1254; Adler, 206 F.3d at 1070. 
 111. Chandler, 230 F.3d at 1315. 
 112. Id. at 1316. 
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unscheduled recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in the graduation ceremony.113  
The school district had decided to eliminate the planned invocation and 
benediction from the graduation ceremony after the ACLU threatened a 
lawsuit.  At the beginning of the ceremony, the audience was advised of the 
change in the program due to the pending legal challenge.  Based on the 
district’s past practice of allowing school board members whose children were 
graduating to speak during the ceremony, board member Scheer was given an 
opportunity to deliver a short message.  After brief remarks, Scheer proceeded 
to recite the Lord’s Prayer and encouraged others to join him.  The Eighth 
Circuit found the board member’s expression to be private and thus 
constitutionally protected, even though it took place at a school-sponsored 
event, and Scheer was on the governing board of the school district.114  The 
court concluded that there was no affirmative school sponsorship of the prayer 
and declined to view Scheer as representing the school simply because of his 
position.115 
The trend in litigation involving student-initiated devotionals is not as clear 
as the accommodationist trend pertaining to equal school access for religious 
groups or to the use of public funds to support services in religious schools.  
Nonetheless, courts in recent decisions seem far more likely than in the past to 
rely on the Free Speech Clause in expanding First Amendment protection of 
religious expression in public schools and to interpret broadly what is private 
in contrast to school-sponsored expression.  At the same time, the judiciary is 
contracting the circumstances in public schools that would abridge the 
Establishment Clause. 
IV.  OTHER RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES 
In addition to controversies about meetings of community and student 
religious groups and student-initiated devotionals in public schools, a number 
of other topics have generated legal action in connection with religious 
influences in public schools.  This section briefly addresses the recitation of the 
Pledge of Allegiance and the distribution and posting of religious materials in 
public schools. 
A. Pledge of Allegiance 
It has been well established for sixty years that schoolchildren cannot be 
required to say the Pledge of Allegiance if such an observance conflicts with 
their religious or philosophical beliefs. 116  In so ruling, the Supreme Court in 
 
 113. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of Norfolk, 340 F.3d 605, 611-13 (8th Cir. 2003) (all facts in this 
section are taken from pages 607-09 of the court’s opinion). 
 114. Id. at 611. 
 115. Id. at 612-13. 
 116. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette overturned a precedent 
established by the Court only three years earlier.117  In Barnette, the Court held 
that refusal to participate in the flag-salute and pledge does not interfere with 
the rights of others to do so or threaten any type of disruption.118  Thus, state 
action to compel this observance unconstitutionally “invades the sphere of 
intellect and spirit” that the First Amendment is designed “to reserve from all 
official control.”119  The Court declared: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no 
official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act 
their faith therein.120 
The controversial issue currently is whether saying the Pledge in public 
schools violates the Establishment Clause because the phrase, “one nation 
under God,” was added in 1954.121  In short, can public schoolchildren say the 
Pledge at all without offending the Constitution? 
In 1992, the Seventh Circuit rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to 
an Illinois law requiring daily recitation of the Pledge in public schools, 
concluding that the words “under God” did not change this patriotic 
observance into a religious exercise that advances religion.122  The appeals 
court reasoned that the “ceremonial deism” in the Pledge has “lost through rote 
repetition any significant religious content.”123  The court held that as long as 
students could decline to participate in the Pledge, there was no First 
Amendment violation.124 
A Virginia federal district court similarly held that saying the Pledge in 
public schools did not abridge the Establishment Clause.125  The court 
 
 117. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding a Pennsylvania 
law requiring the flag salute and Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, reasoning that obedience 
to a general law that is not designed to promote or restrict religious beliefs can be required, even 
though it conflicts with some religious convictions). 
 118. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. 
 119. Id. at 642.  Based on Barnette, several courts subsequently have protected students’ 
rights not only to decline to participate for religious or philosophical reasons in the flag-salute 
ceremony, but also to register a silent protest by remaining seated during the observance.  See, 
e.g., Lipp v. Morris, 579 F.2d 834, 836 (3rd Cir. 1978); Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 638-39 
(2d Cir. 1973). 
 120. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 121. See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 122. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21 of Wheeling Township, 980 F.2d 437, 447-48 
(7th Cir. 1992). 
 123. Id. at 447 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984)). 
 124. Sherman, 980 F.2d at 441 (interpreting the law as requiring “willing” students to 
participate; students offended by the reference to the deity would not have to say the Pledge). 
 125. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268-70 (E.D.Va. 2003).  
See infra note 178 and accompanying text. 
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reasoned that a civic religion has been recognized in our nation, which is 
tolerated when sectarian exercises are not, and found the reference to God in 
the Pledge to be “theologically benign.”126  Even though the school district at 
issue considered recitation of the Pledge in a citizenship reward program, the 
court rejected the contention that students were psychologically coerced into 
accepting religious views sponsored by the school or punished by having to 
listen to classmates recite the Pledge.127  The court noted that other factors 
were also considered in making the citizenship awards, so there was no 
coercion to participate in the Pledge.128  And, like the Seventh Circuit, the 
district court was convinced that “under God” represents “ceremonial deism,” 
which does not abridge the Establishment Clause.129 
The “ceremonial deism” justification is somewhat troublesome.  Whether 
courts endorsing this rationale mean to limit this justification to religious 
references in observances that are patriotic or at least primarily secular in 
nature is not completely clear.  If simply the rote repetition converts religious 
phrases into permissible “ceremonial deism,” this rationale might be used to 
justify the daily recital of other religious materials used in a rote manner in 
public schools.  One commentator has noted that this justification can insulate 
“longstanding public practices that invoke a nonspecific deity for secular 
purposes from Establishment Clause scrutiny.”130  It remains to be seen how 
extensively this rationale will be used to condone religious references to 
solemnize public events. 
The Ninth Circuit attracted national attention in 2002 when it rejected the 
“ceremonial deism” justification and declared that saying the Pledge in public 
schools abridges the Establishment Clause by endorsing a belief in 
monotheism.131  The appellate panel in Newdow v. U.S. Congress initially 
applied the Lemon, coercion, and endorsement standards in reaching its 
conclusion.132  In an amended, narrower ruling, the appeals court did not 
 
 126. Id. at 1267-68. 
 127. Id. at 1270-72. 
 128. Id. at 1270. 
 129. Id. at 1268. 
 130. Charles G. Warren, No Need to Stand on Ceremony: The Corruptive Influence of 
Ceremonial Deism and the Need for a Separationist Reconfiguration of the Supreme Court’s 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1669, 1686 (2003). 
 131. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 2002), judgment stayed, No. 00-
16423, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 12826 (June 27, 2002), opinion amended and superseded by, 328 
F.3d 466 (2003), cert. granted in part sub nom. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. 
Ct. 384 (2003).  See also Circle Sch. v. Phillips, 270 F. Supp. 2d 616 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (issuing a 
permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of a state law requiring recitation of the Pledge or 
the National Anthem each morning in schools; the law’s provision stipulating that parents of any 
non-participating student will be notified is an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction on 
speech). 
 132. Newdow, 292 F.3d at 607-11. 
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invalidate the federal law amending the Pledge but focused on the coercive 
effect of the school district’s policy requiring its recitation in public schools.133  
The court found the coercive impact particularly harmful in school settings, 
given the age and impressionability of children who “are required to adhere to 
the norms set by their school, their teacher, and their fellow students.”134  The 
court emphasized that the words “under God” had been inserted to promote 
religion rather than to advance the legitimate secular goal of encouraging 
patriotism.135 
The appellate ruling drew immediate political responses; indeed, the 
Senate passed a unanimous resolution supporting the Pledge and its reference 
to “one nation under God.”136  The House passed a similar resolution by a vote 
of 416 to 3.137  The Supreme Court has agreed to review the Ninth Circuit 
ruling, which is being called the most important case on the Court’s 2004 
docket.138 
There are two issues before the Supreme Court in this case.  First, does 
Newdow, an atheist, have standing to challenge recitation of the Pledge as 
abridging his rights to direct his daughter’s religious upbringing?  This issue is 
complicated by the fact that the child’s mother has custody and has indicated 
that their daughter is not harmed by the Pledge being said at her school.139  
Assuming that the case survives the standing issue, the Court is then asked to 
address the legality of policies and laws mandating recitation of the Pledge in 
public schools.  The Court may rely on the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, 
reiterating the “ceremonial deism” rationale,140 or it may rely on tradition and 
the historical acceptance of the Pledge, as it did to condone opening legislative 
sessions with prayers in Marsh v. Chambers.141 
 
 133. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 487-88. 
 134. Id. at 488. 
 135. Id. 
 136. S. Res. 292, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. S6105 (daily ed. June 27, 2002).  See James 
Piereson, “Under God” The History of a Phrase, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 27, 2003, at 19. 
 137. H.R. Res. 459, 107th Cong., 148 CONG. REC. H4125 (daily ed. June 28, 2002). 
 138. Considerable controversy followed Justice Scalia’s comments voicing disapproval of the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling, so he removed himself from the case.  Thus, a four-four decision is 
possible that affirms the Ninth Circuit’s ruling without establishing a national precedent. 
 139. See Mom: Girl Not Harmed by Pledging “Under God” (July 16, 2002), at 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/16/pledge.mother/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2004). 
 140. In dicta in several majority, as well as concurring Supreme Court opinions, there have 
been passing references to the constitutionality of the Pledge and similar secular, patriotic 
observances that include a religious reference.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 
573, 602-03 (1989); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 n.5 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676, (1984); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303-04 (1963) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962). 
 141. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
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Civil libertarians concede that the Pledge is a patriotic observance and not 
a prayer, but nonetheless, they find it difficult to justify the addition of the 
phrase “under God,” unless intended to promote religious doctrine.142  Indeed, 
when President Eisenhower signed the law adding the phrase, he observed that 
from that day forward, schoolchildren would proclaim “the dedication of our 
nation and our people to the Almighty.”143 Additionally, the amendment’s 
sponsors indicated that the purpose of the addition to the Pledge was to affirm 
the United States as a religious nation distinguished from atheistic 
communism.144  If the Supreme Court should strike down the contested 
practice or affirm the appellate decision by a four-four split, the political 
reactions are likely to be significant. 
B. Distribution of Religious Literature and Gifts 
Also generating recent litigation has been the application of the First 
Amendment to requests by religious groups and by students to distribute 
sectarian literature and gifts that carry religious messages in public schools.  
There has been no Supreme Court decision, but lower courts have consistently 
ruled that public school personnel cannot distribute Bibles or other religious 
materials to students.145  Most courts also have prohibited religious sects, such 
as the Gideons, from coming to the school to distribute materials to willing 
students, given the captive public school audience.146 
The Fourth Circuit, however, upheld a West Virginia school district’s 
policy allowing sectarian organizations and political groups to distribute 
materials (i.e., Bibles) in public secondary schools on a designated day; such 
distribution by private organizations was not found to represent the school.147  
 
 142. Pierson, supra note 136, at 19. 
 143. Id.  One commentator has observed: 
The impact cannot be lightly dismissed as de minimis.  Decisions about religion are often 
crucial to self identity, for believers and nonbelievers alike.  The religious language in the 
Pledge of Allegiance was important to those who supported its insertion in 1954, and it is 
important to those who continue to support its inclusion.  But it is just as important to 
those Americans who feel alienated by its message of exclusion.  For them, it is a big 
deal. 
John E. Thompson, What’s the Big Deal? The Unconstitutionality of God in the Pledge of 
Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 563, 597 (2003). 
 144. See H.R. Rep. No. 83-1693, at 1-2 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2339; Steven 
Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2118-
21 (1996). 
 145. See, e.g., Yazied Jabr v. Rapides Parish Sch. Bd., 171 F. Supp. 2d 653, 667 (W. D. La. 
2001) (finding that school principal violated the Establishment Clause by distributing New 
Testament Bibles to public school students). 
 146. See, e.g., Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160, 1171 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 147. Peck v. Upshur County Bd. of Educ., 155 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 1998).  See also 
Meltzer v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 577 F.2d 311, 312, 315 (5th Cir. 1978) (allowing distribution 
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The court noted that the displays included a disclaimer disavowing school 
sponsorship or endorsement of the materials and that access to the forum was 
available to a range of religious and secular groups.148  Although the 
distribution was allowed in secondary schools, the policy was invalidated at 
the elementary level because younger children are more impressionable and 
less able to distinguish private from school-sponsored speech.149 
Recent controversies have focused on student requests to distribute 
religious materials. Like student religious meetings, courts traditionally 
distinguished the distribution of religious from secular literature, concluding 
that public schools could bar sectarian distributions to avoid Establishment 
Clause violations.150  More recently, however, Free Speech Clause 
considerations have prevailed over Establishment Clause concerns, with most 
courts concluding that the same legal principles govern students’ distribution 
of religious and nonreligious literature.151  A Colorado federal district court 
held that high school students had a free expression right to distribute a 
religious newsletter in the absence of any disturbance.152  Reflecting similar 
reasoning, a Pennsylvania federal district court held that junior high students 
were entitled to distribute religious material during non-instructional time.153  
The Seventh Circuit also distinguished public and private speech in holding 
that students in an Illinois junior high school could distribute a religious 
newspaper in the public school, which is a nonpublic forum, but the 
distribution could be restricted to specified times at a table near the school’s 
entrance.154 
 
of Gideon Bibles in public schools under strict guidelines governing the location and means of 
distribution). 
 148. Peck, 155 F.3d at 278. 
 149. Id. at 288.  See also Bacon v. Bradley-Bourbonnais High Sch. Dist. No. 307, 707 F. 
Supp. 1005, 1010 (C.D. Ill. 1989) (upholding distribution of Gideon Bibles on the school-owned 
sidewalk because the sidewalk in front of a high school was considered a public forum for general 
use). 
 150. See Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 243 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546, 551 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (holding that a student religious club did not have a right to distribute its materials on 
the high school campus or advertise in the school’s yearbook because the school had not created a 
limited forum for noncurriculum student groups, and even if it had, the Establishment Clause 
would prohibit using the school’s authority to promote religious groups). 
 151. See infra notes 152-163 and accompanying text. 
 152. Rivera v. E. Otero Sch. Dist. R-1, 721 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (D. Colo. 1989).  See also 
Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1545 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the same rules 
to the distribution of religious and secular student literature). 
 153. Thompson v. Waynesboro Area Sch. Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (M.D. Pa. 1987).  
See also Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 296 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
 154. Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist., 807 F. Supp. 444, 462-63 (N.D. Ill. 1992), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part and remanded, 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1993) (also upholding the part 
of the district’s policy restricting distribution of materials prepared by non-students to ten or 
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In a higher education decision, the Supreme Court in 1995 ruled that a 
public university could not withhold support from a student religious group 
seeking to use student activity funds to publish sectarian materials.155  The 
majority’s holding — that religious material must be treated like other material 
in student-initiated publications subsidized by the university — has 
implications for literature distribution in public schools.156  The Court declared 
that the government’s equal treatment of religious and secular private 
expression is not only permitted by the Establishment Clause but in some 
circumstances is required by the Free Speech Clause.157 
More recently, the Ninth Circuit found viewpoint discrimination in a 
school district’s refusal to allow the distribution of flyers for a summer 
camp.158  The district allowed literature to be distributed during non-
instructional time but prohibited commercial, political, or religious 
materials.159  School authorities rejected distribution of the camp flyers 
because two of the camp’s offerings were religious in nature (Bible Heroes and 
Bible Tales).160  Recognizing the “confusing intersection of First Amendment 
rights,” the court nonetheless ruled that the district’s prohibition on selected 
perspectives violated the Free Speech Clause and did not implicate the 
Establishment Clause.161  The court reasoned that the school district had 
created a forum with the broad purpose of providing a community service by 
notifying students and their parents about activities of interest.162  The court 
recognized, however, that the school district could require any proselytizing 
language to be removed from the flyer.163 
Conflicting opinions have been rendered recently regarding student 
distribution of gifts with religious messages to classmates.  A Massachusetts 
federal district court issued an injunction against school authorities who were 
prohibiting members of a high school religious club from distributing candy 
canes with religious messages during non-instructional time.164  The court 
reasoned that the distribution did not represent the school and was thus 
 
fewer copies, reasoning that it is an important part of education for students to learn to express 
themselves in their own words). 
 155. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 820 (1995). 
 156. Id. at 845-46. 
 157. Id. at 846.  See Arval A. Morris, Separation of Church and State — Remarks on 
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 103 EDUC. L. REP. 553,-571 (1995). 
 158. Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., 329 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 
124 S. Ct. 1146 (2004). 
 159. Id. at 1047. 
 160. Id. at 1046, 1048. 
 161. Id. at 1046, 1056. 
 162. Id. at 1051. 
 163. Hills, 329 F.3d at 1052-53. 
 164. Westfield High Sch. L.I.F.E. Club v. City of Westfield, 249 F. Supp. 2d 98 (D. Mass. 
2003). 
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protected private expression under the First Amendment.165  Yet, the Third 
Circuit upheld the school officials’ action in prohibiting elementary school 
students from distributing pencils and candy canes with religious messages 
during classroom holiday parties.166  The court concluded that reasonable 
accommodations were made because religious materials could be distributed 
before and after school and during recess.167  The court noted the difficulty 
young children would have in distinguishing school sponsorship from private 
religious expression during school activities.168 
The key factors in the constitutional assessment are when and where the 
materials are distributed (i.e., during class or non-instructional time) and who 
distributes the materials (i.e., students or school personnel).  The age of the 
students is also a concern, as older children have a greater ability to 
comprehend that materials distributed by classmates do not represent the 
school.  Even when established that religious materials can be distributed, the 
students must comply with the same time, place, and manner regulations 
applied to the distribution of secular materials.169  Although reasonable 
restrictions on how and when materials are distributed have been upheld, 
school districts can no longer use the Establishment Clause as justification for 
a blanket ban on student distribution of religious literature.170 
C. Posting Religious Documents 
This topic is addressed here not only because it is evoking current legal 
activity, but also because it illustrates the limits on religious accommodations 
in public schools.  Most of these controversies involve challenged actions of 
school personnel.  In contrast to the permissible distribution of religious 
materials by private actors during non-instructional time, teachers cannot post 
the same sectarian documents in their classrooms.171  To date, federal courts 
have not allowed the Ten Commandments and other religious materials to be 
posted in public schools, despite mixed decisions regarding the legality of 
 
 165. Id. at 117-18. 
 166. Walz v. Egg Harbor Township Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3597 (2004). 
 167. Id. at 280. 
 168. Id. at 277. 
 169. See Harless v. Darr, 937 F. Supp. 1351, 1353-54 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (supporting a school 
policy requiring students to give the principal advance warning of the distribution and to submit a 
copy of the literature to the superintendent, but not for approval purposes; the policy was not an 
unconstitutional prior restraint on a student’s distribution of religious tracts). 
 170. See Johnston-Loehner v. O’Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575, 580 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (striking 
down a policy requiring students to get the superintendent’s approval before distributing any 
materials on campus; this prior restraint on distributing religious invitations and pamphlets 
inhibited religion in violation of the Establishment Clause). 
 171. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997). 
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religious displays on public property in cases outside the school domain.172  
The Supreme Court struck down a Kentucky law authorizing the posting of the 
Ten Commandments in public schools more than twenty years ago,173 but this 
ruling did not dampen efforts in this regard.  Indeed, since September 11, 2001, 
efforts to post religious documents in public buildings seem to have 
increased.174 
Several federal courts recently have been called on to review policies and 
laws calling for the posting of the Ten Commandments in public buildings, 
including schools.  In an Indiana case, the Seventh Circuit ruled that a 
monument with the Ten Commandments placed on government property 
violated the Establishment Clause.175  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit ordered the 
Ten Commandments to be removed from displays at the entrance of four Ohio 
high schools.176  The Sixth Circuit also held that a school’s display of a portrait 
of Jesus in a school hallway advanced religion in violation of the 
Establishment Clause.177 
In contrast, a Virginia federal district court rejected an Establishment 
Clause challenge to the application of a state law requiring the posting of “In 
God We Trust” in public schools.178  The challenge asserted that the motto was 
posted with a religious design supplied by a conservative group and therefore 
advanced religion.179  The relief sought was to replace the poster with a 
religiously neutral design and clear identification of the phrase as the national 
motto.  Finding the motto to be secular, the court concluded that the posters in 
question did not offend the Establishment Clause.180 
 
 172. See, e.g., Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) 
(upholding the Ku Klux Klan’s display of an unattended cross on state-owned property during 
Christmas season); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (upholding display of 
Menorah with a Christmas tree in front of a government building as celebrating religious liberty, 
but striking down display of the nativity scene with a religious banner in county courthouse as 
advancing the Christian faith); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding use of public 
funds to erect a Christmas display with the nativity scene in a private park). 
 173. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). 
 174. American Atheists, Religious Brush Wars Over Slogans, Creationism, Prayer Spread 
(Feb. 19, 2002), at http://www.atheists.org/flash.line/igwt4.html. 
 175. See ICLU v. O’Bannon, 259 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162 
(2002).  See also Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 307 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 176. Baker v. Adams County/Ohio Valley Sch. Bd., 310 F.3d 927, 929 (6th Cir. 2002).  See 
also ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v. Harlan County Sch. Dist., 
96 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Ky. 2000). 
 177. Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. Schs., 33 F.3d 679, 683 (6th Cir. 1994).  See also Joki 
v. Bd. of Educ., 745 F. Supp. 823 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (enjoining the display of a religious painting 
in the public high school auditorium). 
 178. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1275 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 179. Id. at 1273. 
 180. Id. at 1270. 
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In an unusual Pennsylvania case, a federal district court rejected an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a school district’s winter display and 
program that included a menorah, Kwanzaa candelabra and cloth, books about 
Kwanzaa and Hanukkah, a “giving” tree, books on holidays, a banner with 
“Happy Holidays,” Hanukkah songs, a Kwanzaa chant, and secular Christmas 
songs (i.e., Frosty the Snowman).181  The thrust of the complaint was that the 
display and program were not “Christian enough.”182  Disagreeing, the court 
reasoned that the intent of the program and display was to celebrate religious 
diversity and the freedom for individuals to choose their own beliefs.183  There 
was no Establishment Clause violation because the program did not promote a 
particular faith at the expense of others.184 
A federal district court in New Jersey also found that inclusion of religious 
holidays such as Christmas and Hanukkah on school calendars did not violate 
the Establishment Clause.185  The court reasoned that depiction of the holidays 
was designed to broaden students’ sensitivity toward religious diversity and 
their understanding of the role of religion in society.186 
A few cases have addressed private choices, rather than school decisions, 
to post religious documents or inscriptions in school buildings or on school 
grounds.  For example, a Virginia federal district court addressed a First 
Amendment challenge to a high school’s ban on placing religious inscriptions 
on bricks placed on the school’s “walk of fame.”187  Initially, patrons could 
choose to put crosses on their bricks, but school authorities subsequently 
removed bricks with crosses because of Establishment Clause concerns.  The 
school provided replacement bricks for those removed.  Several patrons who 
had selected crosses challenged the school’s action.  The court recognized that 
 
 181. Sechler v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 121 F. Supp. 2d 439, 441 (M.D. Pa. 2000).  
One of the plaintiffs in this case, David Saxe, had sued the school district on other occasions 
alleging that his Christian beliefs were not provided sufficient recognition or were discriminated 
against by school district policies.  See, e.g., Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 182. Sechler, 121 F. Supp. at 446.  See also Skoros v. City of New York, No. CV-02-6439 
(CPS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2234 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (holding that the exclusion of 
crèches in a school’s holiday display with symbols of Kwanzaa, Hanukkah, Ramadan, and 
Christmas did not reflect unconstitutional hostility toward Christianity, but instead served the 
holiday display policy’s secular purpose by limiting the symbols to those that had developed 
significant secular connotations). 
 183. Sechler, 121 F. Supp. 2d at 451. 
 184. Id.  See also Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(finding no Establishment Clause violation in the prudent and objective observance of Christmas, 
given its historical and cultural significance, even though the program included religious songs, 
such as Silent Night, and displayed the nativity scene). 
 185. Clever v. Cherry Hill Township Bd. of Educ., 838 F. Supp. 929, 930 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 186. Id. at 932. 
 187. Demmon v. Loudoun County Pub. Schs., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689, 691-92 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(all facts in this section are taken from pages 691-92 of the court’s opinion). 
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restrictions in a limited forum, such as the walk of fame, must relate to the 
purpose of the forum and be viewpoint neutral.188  Noting that the Supreme 
Court has not clarified whether a concern about avoiding an Establishment 
Clause violation can justify viewpoint discrimination in a limited forum, the 
court declined to dismiss as a matter of law the plaintiffs’ free speech claims or 
their claim that the exclusion of any religious symbols on the walk inhibited 
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.189  However, the court found 
no special disabilities placed on the plaintiffs because of their religion and thus 
dismissed the Free Exercise Clause claim.190 
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit upheld a school district’s prohibition on 
religious messages on decorative tiles to commemorate the fatal shootings at 
Columbine High School in 1999.191  The court concluded that the project 
entailed school-sponsored speech, pertained to pedagogical concerns, and 
would reasonably be perceived to represent the school.192  Thus, the school 
district’s restrictions on the inscriptions on the tiles did not have to be 
viewpoint neutral because they were related to the pedagogical concern of 
preventing the walls from generating religious debate that would disrupt the 
learning environment.193 
The Seventh Circuit in 2001 also upheld a principal’s action in barring a 
student religious group from including a large cross in the group’s hallway 
mural.194  All student groups had been invited to paint hallway murals, and 
their sketches were reviewed by the principal, who rejected the cross as well as 
other groups’ use of a swastika and a brand of beer.195  The Court of Appeals 
found no EAA violation, noting that the Act does not restrict the authority of 
the school to maintain order and discipline.196  The court reasoned that the 
 
 188. Id. at 694. 
 189. Id. at 696-98. 
 190. Id. at 698. 
 191. Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 934 (10th Cir. 2002).  See 
also Anderson v. Mex. Acad. & Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (upholding 
exclusion of school walkway bricks with Christian messages). 
 192. Fleming, 298 F.3d at 934. 
 193. Id.  In some instances community groups have sought school access for religious 
advertisements. See DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the school could bar religious advertisements from the fence surrounding its 
baseball field because the fence was a nonpublic forum open only for limited purposes; fears 
about violating the Establishment Clause were reasonable, and the exclusion of religious ads was 
not viewpoint discrimination). 
 194. Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 469-70 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 195. Id. at 466. 
 196. Id. at 467. 
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principal was justified in acting against the three proposals that he feared 
would lead to lawsuits or disorder.197 
It seems easier to build the case that the posting of religious documents and 
inscriptions, regardless of the initiators, will be viewed as school sponsored if 
posted in school facilities or on school grounds.  Unlike the distribution of 
literature, where individuals can decline to accept the material and can 
ascertain that those offering the literature do not represent the school, 
documents that are posted in school buildings or on school grounds are more 
permanent and available for all to view whether they want to or not. 
V.  FEDERAL GUIDANCE: CLARIFICATION OR CONFUSION? 
The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, signed into law in 2002, is the 
most comprehensive reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965.198  Among its many provisions, the NCLB Act requires 
school districts to certify to the state educational agency that no school policy 
prevents or denies participation in constitutionally protected prayer in public 
elementary and secondary schools.199  For the first time, such certification is 
required and tied to federal aid.200  In short, federal funds can be withheld from 
school districts that are not in compliance with the certification requirement. 
States were given until April 15, 2003 to submit the initial list of local 
school districts that had not filed the required certification, and such lists must 
be submitted by November 1st in all subsequent years.201  Although a number 
of school districts and a few states had not certified their compliance by the 
initial deadline, the Department of Education reported in June 2003 that all 
fifty states and the District of Columbia had met the certification 
requirement,202 and the Department does not anticipate withholding federal 
funds from school districts in the future. 
The NCLB Act also requires the U.S. Secretary of Education to issue 
guidance to school districts regarding permissible religious activities.203  
Accordingly, in February 2003, the U.S. Department of Education issued its 
Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and 
 
 197. Id. at 466 (the court did not address the claim that suppressing sectarian symbols violated 
the religion clauses). 
 198. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2002)). 
 199. 20 U.S.C. § 7904 (2002). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Guidance on Constitutionally Protected Prayer in Public Elementary and Secondary 
Schools, 68 Fed. Reg. 9645, 9646 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter Guidance]. 
 202. Mark Walsh, States Say They’re Following Prayer Proviso, EDUC. WK., June 4, 2003, at 
21, 23. 
 203. 20 U.S.C. § 7904 (2002). 
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Secondary Schools,204 intended to identify religious activities that must be 
allowed in public schools.  The Guidance covers a number of areas, and for 
those topics without a definitive Supreme Court ruling, it supports conservative 
citizen groups’ expansive interpretation of permissible religious activities in 
public schools.205  As a result, there are discrepancies between the Guidance 
and some judicial decisions.  Joseph Conn of Americans United for Separation 
of Church and State has noted that the Guidance is “really pushing the 
envelope on religion in public schools.”206 
For example, the Guidance stipulates that student speakers at 
extracurricular events, including sporting events, can express religious views, 
as long as neutral criteria are used to select the speakers.207  However, the 
Guidance statement is difficult to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s position 
in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, where the Court struck down 
student-led devotionals at public school football games because the 
devotionals, delivered over the school’s public address system at a school-
sponsored event and under the supervision of school personnel, could not be 
considered private expression.208  The Guidance suggests that if the students 
had been selected by neutral criteria, the prayers would have been 
constitutionally permissible,209 but the Supreme Court did not so rule in Santa 
Fe.210  It was not only the student election deciding whether to have the 
devotionals that offended the Establishment Clause; given the setting and use 
of school equipment and facilities, the devotionals were viewed as being 
endorsed by the public school.211 
The Guidance also states that teachers and other school employees can 
participate in devotional meetings during non-instructional time (i.e., before 
school, during lunch), as long as they are not representing the public school.212  
This conflicts with an earlier Seventh Circuit decision that faculty have no 
First Amendment right to hold prayer meetings in public schools before 
students arrive.213  Moreover, it seems unrealistic to expect elementary-age 
children to be able to ascertain when their teachers are functioning as “private” 
individuals rather than as their teachers.  Allowing teachers to participate in 
prayer meetings before school seems to stretch the meaning of private 
expression far beyond any judicial precedents. 
 
 204. Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9645. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Walsh, supra note 202, at 25. 
 207. Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647. 
 208. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000).  See also supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 209. See Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. at 9647-48. 
 210. See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 290-91. 
 211. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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The Guidance further stipulates that students may express their religious 
views in their homework, artwork, and other written and oral assignments.214  
Yet, several courts have ruled that school personnel can censor student 
presentations to ensure that students are not proselytizing their classmates.215  
In most of these cases, the schools have prevailed in denying the students’ 
requests.  For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a school district’s prohibition 
of an elementary school student from showing, during class, a videotape of 
herself singing a proselytizing religious song.216  Recognizing that the public 
school curriculum is supervised by faculty and designed to impart knowledge, 
the appeals court held that student projects could be censored.217  The same 
court backed a junior high school teacher who gave a student a zero on a report 
because the student had cleared a different topic with the teacher but then 
wrote her report on the life of Jesus Christ.218 
The Guidance states that “students may pray with fellow students during 
the school day on the same terms and conditions that they may engage in other 
conversation or speech.”219  This statement sweeps far more broadly than do 
judicial interpretations of the First Amendment.  Whereas schoolchildren 
engage in numerous secular conversations with classmates during the 
instructional day, most courts have relegated student-led devotionals to non-
instructional time.220  Yet, the Guidance makes it sound like a contrary 
position is well-settled law in this area. 
Barry Lynn, Executive Director of Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, has asserted that the Guidance places school officials 
“between a rock and a hard place in either obeying the interpretation of law 
from the administration, or following the dictates of their local federal 
courts.”221  Given its potential conflicts with judicial rulings, the Guidance has 
not clarified what religious activities are permissible in public schools.  
Instead, the Guidance may actually trigger additional litigation as courts and 
legislative bodies struggle to identify the appropriate church/state relationship 
in public education. 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2004] RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 595 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The principle that the First Amendment demands government neutrality 
toward religion has been easier to assert than to apply.222  From the 1960s 
through the mid-1980s the federal judiciary seemed more committed to 
enforcing Establishment Clause restrictions in elementary and secondary 
school settings than elsewhere, given the vulnerability of the young captive 
audience.  Recently, however, courts have seemed more inclined to support 
government accommodation of religion in the school context, thus 
relinquishing what has been the last stronghold of separationist doctrine. 
A hierarchy of First Amendment freedoms seems to be in place.  Although 
the Supreme Court has skillfully avoided a direct confrontation between the 
Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, free speech guarantees clearly have 
been dominant in recent cases.223  On the winding path toward 
accommodation, only blatant efforts by school personnel to impose devotional 
activities in public schools have been invalidated.224  By focusing on the 
expressive aspect of devotionals and continually expanding what is considered 
private expression, courts have a powerful justification for protecting religious 
expression and diminishing the circumstances that would trigger the 
Establishment Clause.  Indeed, with the expansive Free Speech Clause 
protection of private religious expression in public schools, the EAA seems 
unnecessary. 
It may appear that saying brief prayers and posting religious documents in 
public schools represent a minor encroachment on individuals’ religious 
liberties.  But, larger inroads are likely to follow as groups and individuals 
continue to press the limits of the Establishment Clause.  The recent judicial 
leniency in authorizing religious influences initiated by private actors in public 
schools combined with the trend of allowing more government aid to religious 
schools225 suggests that the Establishment Clause has lost its former vitality as 
an independent constitutional guarantee.  The federal government is supporting 
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this accommodationist trend with administrative policies and its position in 
amicus curiae briefs.226  Furthermore, this doctrinal change may portend a 
significant transformation in the nature and structure of education in our 
nation, with more religious influences in public schools and increased state aid 
to sectarian schools. 
Many devoutly religious Americans contend that separation of church and 
state is in the best interest of religious practice as well as government policies, 
because when government and religion are united, both are harmed in 
significant ways.227  Justice Brennan once observed that “it is not only the 
nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and controversies 
into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the 
secularization of a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and 
dependent upon the government.”228 
One does not have to look back in history to find examples of the negative 
results of commingling religion and government.  Indeed, today there are daily 
reminders that religious establishments generate strife and war.  Nonetheless, 
efforts to put government support behind the dominant faith in our nation 
continue to escalate.  Our citizenry would be wise to revisit a statement made 
by the Supreme Court fifty years ago: “There cannot be the slightest doubt that 
the First Amendment reflects the philosophy that church and state should be 
separated . . . .  [T]he separation must be complete and unequivocal.”229  
Unfortunately, there is plenty of doubt today. 
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